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WHY STUDY PACIFIC SALMON LAW?
MICHAEL

C. BLUMM*

Salmon and steelhead trout' are to the water resource what the
miner's canary is to air quality in a mine: they are effective barometers
of the adequacy of the water resource to support a host of consumptive
and recreational uses. These majestic fish, some of which migrate from
2
the mountain streams of Idaho to the icy waters of Alaska and back,3
are biological wonders. They are also of considerable economic value.
Because of their continuing importance to the sport, commerce, cul-

* Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School; LL.M. 1979, J.D. 1976, George
Washington University; B.A. 1972, Williams College. This Article was written under a
grant to the Natural Resources Law Institute from the Oregon State University Sea
Grant College Program, supported by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, United States Department of Commerce (Grant No. NA 81AA-D-00086). However, views expressed here are those of the author alone; they do not represent the views
of either NOAA or the United States government. My colleague Barbara Safriet provided helpful comments on a draft of this Article, and Chris Kelly and Lenair Mulford
supplied superb editorial assistance.
1. There are five species of Pacific salmonids: (1) Oncorhyncus (0.) tsawytscha,
the chinook or king salmon; (2) 0. nerka, the sockeye or red salmon; (3) 0. kisutch, the
coho or silver salmon; (4) 0. keta, the chum or dog salmon; and (5) 0. gorbuscha, the
pink or humpback salmon. The genus name "Oncorhynchus". means "hooked snout."
The species names are of Russian derivation because they were first described by a naturalist on the Bering expedition in 1737. R. Childerhose & M. Trim, Pacific Salmon 25-26
(1979). The steelhead trout (a sea-run rainbow trout), Salmo gairdneri,is more closely
related to the Atlantic salmon, Salmo salar, than to the Pacific species.
2. For a vivid account of the life history of a Lochsa River, Idaho chinook salmon
in different historical eras, see Wilkinson & Conner, The Law of the Pacific Salmon
Fishery: Conservation and Allocation of a TransboundaryCommon Property Resource,
32 U. Kan. L. Rev. 17, 21-78 (1983).
3. For example, one study estimates that the economic costs of salmon and steelhead losses due to operating the Columbia River System predominately for hydropower
are $370 million annually; cumulative costs since 1960 of $6.5 billion; and future costs of
$3.7 billion (1980 dollars) per decade. P. Meyer, Fish, Energy, and the Columbia River:
An Economic Perspectiveon Fisheries Values Lost and at Risk (Mar. 1982) (paper pro-

duced for the Northwest Resource Information Center), summarized in Natural Resources Law Inst., Economic Value of Salmon Losses Estimated, 18 Anadromous Fish
Law Memo 9 (May 1982). See also E. Chaney, Cogeneration of the Electrical Energy
and Anadromous Salmon and Steelhead in the Upper Columbia River Basin: An Economic Perspective on the Question of Balance (Northwest Resource Information Center,
June 1982).

Electronic
copy available
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2986585
Electronic
copy available
at:at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=2986585

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

ture, and identity of the region, anadromous fish 4 may rightly be considered the Pacific Northwest's most important natural resource just as they were a century and a quarter ago when the Stevens' Treaties were signed. 5
Their environmental sensitivity, immense migrations, and economic value, combined with a long history of bitter allocation struggles, make anadromous fish a fruitful area for legal study. A course in
Pacific Salmon Law offers an opportunity to examine diverse legal
principles - ranging from judicial interpretation of century-old Indian
treaties to administrative implementation of recent federal laws and
international treaties - affecting efforts to preserve, restore, and fairly
allocate the resource. Thus, students are exposed to real property concepts, federal environmental legislation, administrative procedure, interstate disputes, and international law and custom - topics seldom
explored in a single law school course. In addition, the course involves
interdisciplinary issues, such as how decision makers should be affected by cost-benefit analysis, scientific uncertainty, and biological
concerns like genetic diversity. The course also enables students to
study the often overlooked historical dimension to natural resource
management, for the challenges of restoring salmon runs today are
heavily influenced by regional economic forces at work since at least
the 1930s.
Teaching the only course in the country in Pacific Salmon Law, I
contribute this Article to the Symposium in the hope that other professors and students will see the richness and productive nature of the
subject matter. What follows is an emulation of the European cours,'
an outline of the course as I teach it, designed to survey many aspects
of this fascinating subject.
I. Indian Treaty Fishing Rights
The oldest, yet still quite lively, area of Pacific Salmon Law concerns the treaties that were negotiated by Isaac Ingalls Stevens and

4. Anadromous (meaning ascending rivers to spawn) fish are born in fresh water,
migrate to the ocean for periods of two to five years (depending on the species), and
return to fresh water to spawn. See generally A. Netboy, Salmon: The World's Most
Harassed Fish (1980). Other anadromous species include lamphreys, shad, smelt, and
striped bass.
5. See infra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
6. Inspired by Teacher's Manual (at iii) accompanying C. Donahue, T. Kauper &
P. Martin, Property:An Introduction to the Concept and the Institution (2d ed. 1983);
cf. Sax, Why I Teach Water Law, 18 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 273 (1985).
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Joel Palmer in the 1850s with several Northwest Indian tribes.7 In
these treaties, the tribes ceded some sixty-four million acres of land to
the federal government.8 In return, the federal government provided
nominal monetary benefits and land reservations and also agreed to
the tribes' reservation of (1) the exclusive right to fish on their reservations, and (2) the right "to take fish at all usual and accustomed
grounds and stations, in common with the citizens of the Territory."9
Importantly, these fishing rights were bargained for, reserved rights.
That is, the Indians preserved preexisting rights to ensure their self
sufficiency; they were not granted new fishing rights by the United
States. 10 This classification as reserved rights, along with the Indians'
inequality of bargaining power in the treaty negotiations," led the federal courts to develop canons of treaty interpretation that are quite
generous to the tribes. These canons - by which the courts interpret
treaty terms as the tribes would have understood them, and construe

7. The four major treaties in the Columbia Basin are the Treaty with the Walla
Walla, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 945; the Treaty with the Yakimas, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat.
951; the Treaty with the Nez Perce, June 11, 1855, 12 Stat. 957; and the Treaty with the
Tribes of Middle Oregon, June 25, 1855, 12 Stat. 963; see generally F. Cohen, Handbook
of Federal Indian Law 450-456 (1982 ed.). On the role of the federal negotiators in organizing the tribes, see Wilkinson & Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth" - How Long A
Time Is That? 63 Calif. L. Rev. 601, 610 (1975) ("Friendly Indians were commonly selected as chiefs by federal officials. ..").
8. See Landau, Empty Victories: Indian Treaty Fishing Rights In the Pacific
Northwest, 10 Envtl. L. 412, 417 (1980) (also citing to other treaties signed by Stevens
with Puget Sound Basin tribes); see also Natural Resources Law Inst., Indian Treaty
Fishing Rights and Protection of the Environment, 12 Anadromous Fish Law Memo
(Apr. 1981).
9. See Landau, supra note 8, at 418 (citing article III of the Treaty of Medicine
Creek, Dec. 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1132).
10. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905):
The right to resort to the fishing places in controversy was a part of larger
rights possessed by the Indians, upon the exercise of which there was not a
shadow of impediment, and which were not much less necessary to the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they breathed. New conditions came
into existence, to which those rights had to be accommodated. Only a limitation of them, however, was necessary and intended, not a taking away. In other
words, the treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians but a grant of rights
from them - a reservation of those not granted.
11. Not only did the federal negotiators create "chiefs" with whom to bargain,
supra note 7, they conducted the negotiations in a language - Chinook jargon - unfamiliar to many of the Indians. See Landau, supra note 8, at 417. Moreover, the treaties
were written in English and in legal terms unfamiliar to the Indians. See Wilkinson &
Volkman, supra note 7, at 610-11 (quoting from Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899)).
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ambiguities liberally in the tribes' favor" - essentially are designed to
achieve fair results for the Indians who bargained away so much for
what might have been construed as so little. 3
My Pacific Salmon Law course emphasizes four aspects of the
treaty right to fish: the nature of the right, its relationship to the tribal
reserved water right, its evolution and growth, and the role of the federal courts in defining and implementing the right. First, we explore
the nature of the treaty fishing right by examining a largely forgotten
decision of the Washington Territorial Court, entitled United States v.
Taylor.1 4 In the first reported judicial interpretation of the treaty fishing right, the Taylor court refused to allow a private landowner to construct a fence on his land that would have deprived treaty fishers of
access to a usual and accustomed fishing ground. 5 The right accorded
in Taylor may be characterized as a prescriptive easement, 6 or per-

12. See Coggins & Modrcin, Native American Indians and Federal Wildlife Law,
31 Stan. L. Rev. 375, 386 (1979) (analogizing treaty interpretation to interpretation of
adhesion contracts).
13. From the white perspective, the treaties enabled settlement of the Pacific
Northwest to proceed without the widespread violence that accompanied in other invasions of Indian country. Nevertheless, there was some bloodshed in the wake of the treaties, due to Indian unhappiness with being removed to reservations. See, e.g., R. Ruby &
J. Brown, The Chinook Indians: Traders of the Lower Columbia River 237-38 (1975)
(describing hostilities among the Walla Walla and Yakimas, which spread to Puget
Sound in the fall of 1855 and culminated in the Battle of Seattle in January 1856).
14. 13 P. 333 (Wash. Terr. 1887).
15. The court determined that a liberal construction of the "off reservation" fishing
clause required it to hold that the treaty reserved to the tribes a right to continue to fish
at their historic fishing grounds, regardless of subsequent homestead patents. The court
refused to construe the treaty as a guarantee of access to future fishing grounds on the
same basis with other citizens.
What did the Indians intend to reserve to themselves by the words, 'as also the
right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places, in common with citizens
of the territory?' . . . [alt the time this treaty was made, there existed within
the territory ....
certain ancient fisheries which had for generations been used
as such by said Indians, who had certain well-defined habits and methods connected with such use ... [Wihen we take into consideration the facts disclosed
by this record, and the further fact, which the court knows as a matter of common know-ledge, that these Indians were always tenacious in adhering to past
customs and traditions, we think the contention of... [the tribes] must prevail, as we think it much more natural that these Indians should have desired
to preserve as fully as possible a right then and for a long time before enjoyed
by them, rather than to have provided for a right to be enjoyed in unknown
ways, and under new conditions, even although such new rights might possibly
be of more avail than the old.
Id. at 355 (emphasis added.)
16. See generally Restatement (First) of Property §§ 457-65 (1944); R. Cunningham, W. Stoebuck, D. Whitman, The Law of Real Property § 8.7 (1984) [hereinafter
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haps even as a customary right.' 7 The treaty fishing right also satisfies
the essential elements of an equitable servitude:1 8 (1) the parties to the
original agreement intended the right to bind their successors; (2) nonparty successors (like Taylor) were on actual notice of the exercise
right (obviating the need for record notice); and (3) the right is of sufficient economic importance that it easily satisfies the obscure requirement of "touching and concerning the land."' 9
However, while the fishing right resembles both an easement and
an equitable servitude, familiar concepts from first year Property
courses, it really is a profit a prendre: the less familiar right to enter
the land of another and extract a natural resource.2 0 More precisely, it
is a piscary profit: the right to go upon the land of another and fish, a
right not unusual in common law England.21 Classifying the fishing
right as a cognizable property interest raises the issues of how long the
right should last (how long should a real property title held in fee simple absolute last?), and whether a governmental taking of that right
'
would entitle the tribes to "just compensation. 22
A second aspect of the treaty right to fish is its relationship to the
tribal reserved water right. In 1905 the United States Supreme Court
2
confirmed, in United States v. Winans,'
that the fishing right impresses an implied easement on real property titles, giving the tribes a
perpetual access right to their usual and accustomed fishing grounds.
Only three years later, the Court created the doctrine of Indian reserved water rights in Winters v. United States.2 4 Today, Indian re-

cited as R. Cunningham]. Note that in Idaho the public may not obtain a prescriptive
easement. State ex rel Haman v. Fox, 100 Idaho 140, 594 P.2d 1093 (1979).
17. See State ex rel. Thorton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969); County of
Hawaii v. Sotamura, 55 Hawaii 176, 517 P.2d 57 (1973). Compare access rights based on
the public trust doctrine, Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47
(1972), and implied dedication theory, Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 84 Cal.
Rptr. 162, 465 P.2d 50 (1970).
18. See generally Restatement, supra note 16, § 539; R. Cunningham, supra note
16, §§ 8.22-.31.
19. See Reichman, Toward A Unified Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev.
1177, 1225-30 (1982); French, Toward A Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1261, 1276-81 (1982).
20. See R. Powell & P. Rohan, 3 The Law of Real Property 405 (1984).
21. See H. Tiffany, Outlines of Real Property §§ 290-97 (1929); Blackstone's Commentaries on the Law 232 (B. Gavit ed. 1892) ("Common of piscary is a liberty of fishing
another man's water.").
22. See Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968) (congressional
abrogation gives rise to a Fifth Amendment "takings" claim); see generally F. Cohen,
supra note 7, at 467-70.
23. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
24. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
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served water rights cast an ominous shadow throughout the West,"
threatening to defease long-held state-granted appropriation rights,
even where the Indian rights have not been used2 and appropriators
arguably have had little or no notice of these judicially created water
27
rights.
However threatening Indian reserved water rights are to Western
appropriators, the treaty fishing right, in comparison, is a more secure,
more durable, more defensible, potentially larger, yet perhaps ultimately less menacing right. Unlike the Winans fishing right, Winters
reserved water rights are granted rights, not reservations of preexisting
rights.2 They spring from federal land reservations designed to convert
the Indians into agrarians,2" not from negotiated settlements in which
the tribes bargained to maintain an existing way of life. Thus, the priority date for a reserved water right is the date of the reservation,
while the priority date for the treaty fishing right is "time immemorial." 0 Reserved water rights are implied rights; the treaty fishing right
is an express right.-" Reserved water rights undermine state appropriation systems because they sanction new uses at the expense of established uses, but the treaty fishing right protects only existing uses uses that antedate any appropriator's right. Moreover, unlike the "zero
sum game"' characterizing the assertion of reserved water rights,

25. See generally J. Folk-Williams, What Indian Water Means To the West
(1982).
26. See F. Cohen, supra note 7, at 578.
27. Notice problems, the implied nature of the right, and conflicts with state prior
appropriation systems explain the Supreme Court's reluctance to construe expansively
reserved water rights, at least those appurtenant to non-Indian federal lands. See United
States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978); Fairfax & Tarlock, No Water For the Woods:
A Critical Analysis of United States v. New Mexico, 15 Idaho L. Rev. 509 (1979).
28. Compare United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1414 (9th Cir. 1983) (treaty
hunting and fishing rights of Klamath tribe is a confirmation of reserved aboriginal
rights) with Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 46-47 (9th Cir. 1981)
(tribe's reserved water rights for irrigation due to implied congressional intention in establishing reservation).
29. See United States v. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576 (policy of Congress in creating
reservations to convert "nomadic and uncivilized" Indians to "a pastoral and civilized
people").
30. United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d at 1412-15.
31. Thus the Supreme Court's narrow construction of the contours of the implied
water right in United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 701-02 (1978), might not encumber the express fishing right.
32. See Rodgers, Building Theories of JudicialReview In NaturalResources Law,
53 U. Colo. L. Rev. 213, 221 (1981) (noting the reluctance of decision makers to order
zero sum transfers, where winners gain at the expense of identifiable losers).
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where appropriators often lose "gallon for gallon" as the Indians gain, 8
assertion of the fishing right does not necessarily cost appropriators
their water." '
A third aspect of the study of the treaty fishing right concerns its
growth. In Taylor, and later in Winans, the courts recognized the treaties as reserving to the tribes an access right which could not be denied
by subsequently acquired, state-granted real property titles or fishing
licenses. 5 This access right was soon extended to lands not expressly
conveyed by the Indians in the treaties, but nevertheless used by them
as "usual and accustomed" fishing grounds.6 Subsequently, the same
concern for access to the resource led the Supreme Court to conclude
that the treaty right is not subject to state license fees."
In the 1960s and 1970s, the access right evolved into a limitation
on state regulation when the State of Washington demonstrated it
would deprive the treaty fishery of fair harvest opportunities in the
name of "conservation" regulations. 8 Although it first sanctioned
facially non-discriminatory state regulation of the treaty fishery, 39 the
Supreme Court quickly enjoined facially non-discriminatory state regulations that banned net fishing. 0 Recognizing that the state ban affected only Indian
fishing, the Court called for a "fair apportionment"
41
of the fishery.
When the states of Oregon and Washington proved incapable of
making such an apportionment, the federal courts did it for them.
First, in Sohappy v. Smith, Judge Robert Belloni ordered the State of
Oregon to give the treaty fishery a "fair share" of the harvest and set

33. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 706.
34. See, e.g., Kittitas Reclamation Dist. v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist., 763
F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1985), affirming a district court decision ordering water to be released
from a reclamation dam to protect salmon redds (nests), despite objections of irrigators
that such fishery flows would jeopardize water supplies for irrigation the following year.
However, the reservoir in fact refilled, and the fish flows interfered with no water rights.
35. Like Taylor, 13 P. 333 (Wash. Terr. 1887), supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text, Winans involved a shoreside landowner attempting to exclude treaty Indians
from their fishing grounds. In addition to his real property title, Winans possessed a
state-granted license to operate a fish wheel in the Columbia River. See 198 U.S. at 379.
36. Seufert Bros. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194 (1918).
37. Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 381 (1942).
38. See Johnson, The States Versus Indian Off-Reservation Fishing: A United
States Supreme Court Error,47 Wash. L. Rev. 207 (1972) (pointing out that the state
defined "conservation" broadly to include allocation among competing fishers).
39. Puyallup Tribe v. Dept. of Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968) (Puyallup 1).
40. Dept. of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973) (Puyallup II).
41. Id. at 48. Four years later, the Court rendered yet another opinion in the
Puyallup controversy, approving a forty-five percent allocation of steelhead harvests to
the treaty fishery, Puyallup Tribe v. Dept. of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977) (PuyallupIII).
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substantive and procedural standards by which this share would be determined.' Then, five years later, Judge George Boldt's historic decision in United States v. Washington allocated the treaty and nontreaty fishery on an equal basis. 43 Twice affirmed by the Ninth Circuit," Boldt's allocation was largely ratified by the Supreme Court in
1979. 4" The Court's affirmance noted that the treaty right forbade the

state from "crowding out" the treaty fishery, and that neither party to
the treaties could destroy the other's "fairly apportioned" share of the
resource." According to the Supreme Court, "the central principle here
must be that Indian treaty rights to a natural resource that once was
thoroughly and exclusively exploited by the Indians secures so much
as, but not more than, is necessary to provide the Indians with a liveli''4
hood - that is to say, a moderate living. 7
My course treats the progression of the treaty fishing right as an
historic matter - from an access right to a limit on state regulation to
a right to a share of the harvest. However, the tribes' right to a fair
benefit of their 125-year-old bargain continues to evolve. For example,
the right to a fair share of the harvest may not be satisfied if the fish
runs are so depleted that there are little or no fish left to be harvested.
As the Supreme Court noted, the treaty right assures the tribes more
than "merely the chance . . . occasionally to dip their nets into the

42. 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Or. 1969). In an unpublished judgment, Judge Belloni
established three substantive and three procedural standards that Oregon had to meet
before regulating the treaty fishery. The substantive standards were: (1) the regulations
had to be the least restrictive that could be imposed consistent with assuring necessary
fish for spawning; (2) the state had to deal with the treaty fishery separately and distinctly from other fisheries; and (3) the regulations had to assure the tribes "a fair share"
of the harvest. Belloni's procedural standards required (1) notice to the tribes, (2) an
opportunity for the tribes to be heard, and (3) an opportunity to "participate meaningfully" in the state's regulatory process. Sohappy v. Smith, No. 68-409 (D. Or. Oct. 10,
1969).
43. 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
44. 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976); 573 F.2d 1123
(9th Cir. 1978), aff'g 459 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D. Wash. 1978) (compilation of various posttrial orders). The latter appeal was necessary because the Washington Supreme Court
ruled that the State Department of Fisheries lacked authority to comply with Judge
Boldt's injunction, Puget Sound Gillnetters v. Moos, 88 Wash. 2d 677, 565 P.2d 1151
(1977).
45. 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
46. Id. at 676, 682, 684.
47. Id. at 686. The moderate living standard enables the treaty share to be reduced
below fifty percent of the harvest where, for example, a tribe dwindles "to just a few
members" or finds "other sources of support that lead it to abandon its fisheries." Id. at
687.
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territorial waters.""8 Consequently, in "Phase II" of United States v.
Washington, Judge William Orrick held that the treaty right included
4
a right to have the fish protected against environmental degradation. 9
Although the Ninth Circuit ultimately ruled that establishing this
principle in a summary judgment proceeding was impermissible,"0 both
prior and subsequent case law indicate that the treaty right can be
successfully asserted in a variety of factual contexts to protect fish
habitat. Thus, it can stop construction of dams,"' change the operation
of existing dams, 52 and limit irrigation withdrawals 3 to maintain river
flows necessary for fish propagation.
While the precise scope of the habitat protection right remains unclear, there is little doubt that such an environmental right is included
in the treaty right.5 4 The likely evolution of this aspect of the treaty
right raises a number of issues and problems. Class discussion includes
whether such a right should run against the federal government and
private parties, 56 the balance of the environmental treaty right against

48. Id. at 679.
49. 506 F. Supp. 187, 202-08 (W.D. Wash. 1980).
50. 759 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc); see Natural Resources Law Inst.,
Workshop on the Late, Great Columbia River Fishery (PartII), 33 Anadromous Fish
Law Memo 4-5 (Sept. 1985).
51. Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla v. Alexander, 440 F. Supp. 553 (D. Or.
1977).
52. Kittitas Reclamation Dist. v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist., 763 F.2d 1032
(9th Cir. 1985), see supra note 34. For a district court decision quite similar to Kittitas,
see Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Flathead Irrigation and Power Project,
616 F. Supp. 1292 (D. Mont. 1985). See also Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla v.
Callaway, No. 72-211 (D. Or. Aug. 17, 1973) (declaring that federal hydropower operations may not "impair or destroy" treaty fishing rights, discussed in Blumm, Hydropower vs. Salmon: The Struggle of the Pacific Northwest's Anadromous Fish Runs For
A Peaceful Coexistence With the Federal Columbia River Power System, 11 Envtl. L.
211, 260, 282-83 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Hydropower vs. Salmon]).
53. United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983); see supra notes 28, 30
and accompanying text. See also Colville Tribe v. Walton, 752 F.2d 397, 404-05 (9th Cir.
1985), and United States v. Anderson, No. 3643 (E.D. Wash. July 23, 1979), discussed in
Hydropower vs. Salmon, supra note 52, at 286-87. The latter two cases involved implied
reservation rights, not express treaty rights.
54. All eight appellate judges in the Ninth Circuit who have considered the question of whether there is an implied environmental right in the treaties have answered in
the affirmative, although they have not agreed on the scope of the right. See United
States v. Washington, 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1982) (Judges Sneed, Anderson, and Reinhardt), vacated and replaced by 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc); 759 F.2d at
1362 (concurring and dissenting opinion of Judges Nelson and Skopil); Kittitas, 763 F.2d
1032 (9th Cir. 1985) (Judges Kilkenny, Wright and Canby).
55. Judge Orrick thought the environmental right should run against both the federal government and private parties (in addition to the state), United States v. Washing-
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the myriad of activities that could run afoul of such a right (for example, timber harvesting, small scale hydroelectric projects, and wetland
fills), and how courts might articulate the right to enable federal and
state administrators to apply the right in their proceedings."
A fourth aspect of the treaty fishing right concerns the role of the
federal judiciary in creating, refining, and enforcing the right. This perspective enables the students to consider some of the distinguishing
features of public law litigation s5 in contrast to more traditional, bipolar, retrospective litigation in which the remedy is relatively simple.
Treaty fishing rights, like other forms of public law adjudication, involve numerous parties, predictive facts, negotiated remedies, and the
active involvement of the trial judge." Class discussion focuses on the
dilemma created by institutional limitations of trial judges' roles in
public policymaking 9 and the lack of viable alternatives to the federal
courts' vindication of the treaty right to fish. s0
II.

Hydroelectric Power Production and Fishery Protection

Although there are many causes for the decline of Pacific salmon
runs, there is no question that the chief cause of the decline of the
largest runs - the Columbia Basin runs - is the development and
operation of numerous dams, especially those on the mainstem Colum-

ton, 506 F. Supp. at 208, while Judge Sneed in the panel decision felt it should not run
against private parties, 694 F.2d at 1381 n.15.
56. I suggest the concurring opinion of Judge Reinhardt in the panel decision as a
model, see 694 F.2d at 1389, 1391 (instructing administrators to give treaty rights due
consideration through their decision-making processes by (1) affording the Indians an
opportunity to participate fully, (2) determinining that the project is necessary in light
of any probable adverse fishery effects, (3) analyzing the feasibility of alternative locations for proposed projects, (4) considering all reasonable mitigating measures to avoid
reductions in fish supply, and (5) paying compensation for unavoidable adverse effects).
57. See generally Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
Harv. L. Rev. 1281 (1976).
58. See Broches & Miller, Public Law Litigation and Marine Affairs: The Boldt
Decision, 13 Coastal Zone Mgmt. J. 99 (1985).
59. See, e.g., NRDC v. Hodel, 624 F. Supp. 1045, 1062-63 (D. Nev. 1985) (refusing
to become a judicial "rangemaster," noting courts' lack of training, expertise, time, and
staff assistance).
60. After all, Judges Belloni and Boldt and their colleagues began to interpret and
enforce treaty fishing rights only after the legislative and executive branches failed to do
so, not unlike the response of the federal courts to the desegregation issue. See Puget
Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. United States District Court, 573 F.2d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir.
1978) ("Except for some desegregation cases . . . the district court has faced the most
concerted official and private efforts to frustrate a decree of a federal court witnessed in
this century"). For a recent case study of desegregation in Boston illuminating these
failures, see J.A. Lukas, Common Ground (1985).
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bia and its principal tributary, the Snake River."' Even dams with fish
ladders present a myriad of problems for anadromous fish: they inundate spawning grounds, change water temperatures, alter flow regimes,
increase pollutants like supersaturated gases, disrupt downstream
gravel recruitment, and kill around fifteen percent of downstream migrating juvenile fish per project.6 2 In class, we discuss these problems
in the context of the development and operation of the Columbia River
Power System, the largest interconnected hydroelectric system in the
world. 8 This focus enables the students to survey some Northwest history of considerable importance to today's economy, to investigate the
process of approving federal water projects, to contrast federal project
approval with the licensing procedure for nonfederal dams, and to examine how and why fishery concerns were largely ignored in the development and operation of the system until the 1980s.
Abundant low-cost hydroelectric power has been the engine driving the Northwest's economy since completion of the Bonneville Dam
in the late 1930s." Cheap hydropower was the key to rural electrification, large-scale irrigation, and economic diversification provided by
the electricity-intensive aluminum industry. 65 The blueprint for today's hydroelectric system was etched in a series of Corps of Engineers'
studies on the Columbia River and its tributaries. The first of these

61. Comptroller General, General Accounting Office, Impacts and Implications of
the Pacific Northwest Power Bill at 20 & App. IV at 1 (Rep. No. EMD-79-105, 1979); see
generally Hydropower vs. Salmon, supra note 52.
62. See Hydropower vs. Salmon, supra note 52, at 214-21; Thatcher, The Pacific
Northwest Electric Power Planningand Conservation Act: Fish and Wildlife Protection
Outside the Columbia River Basin, 13 Envtl. L. 517, 520 n.1l (1983); Lothrop, The Failure of the Fish Passage Provisions of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program
and Some Suggested Remedies, 34 Anadromous Fish Law Memo 3-4 (Nov. 1985).
63. Comptroller General, General Accounting Office, Region At the Crossroads The Pacific Northwest Searches For New Sources of Electric Energy at 3.1 (Rep. No.
EMD-78-76, 1978); see generally Wandschneider, Managing River Systems: Centralization Versus Decentralization,24 Nat. Resources J. 1043 (1984) (case study of Columbia
River management).
64. Actually, the first large mainstem Columbia River dam was the Rock Island
Dam. See Federal Power Comm'n, Tenth Annual Rep. 229 (1930); Hydropower vs.
Salmon, supra note 52, at 229. For an excellent historical overview of dam building in
the Columbia Basin, including pre-Rock Island dams, see Goble, Introduction to Symposium on Legal Structures For Managing Pacific Northwest Salmon and Steelhead: The
Biological and Historical Context, 22 Idaho L. Rev. 417 (1986).
65. See generally Blumm, The Northwest's Hydroelectric Heritage: Prologue to
the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planningand ConservationAct, 58 Wash. L. Rev.
175 (1983).
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studies, labeled "308 Reports" by the Corps,66 was submitted to Congress in 1932 and recommended construction of ten multiple use dams
on the mainstem Columbia River.67 All of the sites were subsequently
developed.68 Six years later, a revised 308 Report focused on the Snake
River, largely in response to local interest in providing slack water navigation from the ocean to Lewiston, Idaho." Like its predecessor,
nearly all the sites identified in the 1938 Report were subsequently developed, although some by Idaho Power Company, not the Corps.70
Of particular interest is the approval process of the 308 Reports,
including the criteria for site selection and the decision-making process. Without an Environmental Impact Statement requirement, or
even notice and comment rulemaking, the reports were formulated by
the Corps, the agency which hoped to construct and operate the
projects, on the basis of engineering criteria with little or no involvement of the public or other agencies, save for local congressmen. It is
hardly surprising, therefore, that the 308 Reports emphasized maximum development and gave little attention to the effect of water project development on the existing fish runs. Even when fishery agencies
raised such questions, dam building continued."' With the fishery effects of development unknown, the issue was resolved by placing the
burden of producing information on the affected resource and those
who spoke for it."

66. So named after the original 1926 Corps of Engineers' Report, estimating the
costs of undertaking comprehensive investigations of the nation's river basins. H.R. Doc.
No. 308, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926).
67. H.R. Doc. No. 103, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) (recommending development for
navigation, water power, and irrigation, as well as for work relief programs to combat the
effects of the Great Depression).
68. Actually, eleven dams were constructed, since two mid-Columbia projects
(Priest Rapids and Wanapum) were substituted for the original recommendation. See
Hydropower vs. Salmon, supra note 52, at 225-26 n.62.
69. See id. at 229-30 (noting that the Corps of Engineers originally estimated the
navigation and irrigation benefits of lower Snake River development at about 15% of its
costs).
70. See id. at 233, 238-41.
71. See id. at 228-29 (1938 Report of the Commission of Fisheries, prompting enactment of the Mitchell Act, 16 U.S.C. § 755 (1982), to fund Columbia River fish hatcheries), 236-37 (1950 "308" Report, including a Fish and Wildlife Service plan to compensate for upriver fishery losses with lower river hatcheries); Columbia River Inter-Tribal
Fish Comm'n., The Mitchell Act: An Analysis (1981).
72. See Blumm, Fulfilling the Parity Promise: A Perspective On Scientific Proof,
Economic Cost, and Indian Treaty Rights In the Approval of the Columbia Basin Fish
and Wildlife Program, 13 Envtl. L. 103, 110-11 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Parity II].
Imposing the burden of proof on those seeking to change the status quo is, of course, not
unsual, especially where change might require foregoing benefits. See, e.g., J. Krier & E.

Electronic
copy available
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2986585
Electronic
copy available
at:at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=2986585

1986]

COURSE OUTLINE

Although not authorized primarily for hydroelectric purposes,"'
Columbia Basin dams are operated principally for power generation,
largely on the basis of intergovernmental agreements and other contractual arrangements.7 4 It is possible that such contracts could insulate system operations from subsequently enacted statutes that seek to
improve fish survival. Consequently, in class we consider the capability
of several prominent environmental laws to compel dam operators to
provide fish flows and spills.
This part of the course presents the opportunity to review the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),7 5 the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act (Coordination Act) 7 0 the Clean Water Act 7 7 and the
Endangered Species Act.7 While some of these statutes have been invoked to block construction of projects such as the High Mountain
Sheep Dam,7 they have had surprisingly little effect on individual dam
operations 0 and no material effect on systemwide operations. This is
partly because some of the statutes depend upon promulgation of rules

Ursin, Pollution and Policy: A Case Essay on Californiaand FederalExperiences With
Motor Vehicle Pollution 1940-75, at 257-63 (1977).
73. See Hydropower vs. Salmon, supra note 52, at 228.
74. See Pacific Northwest Coordination Agreement, Agreement for Coordination
Among Power Systems of the Pacific Northwest (1964) discussed in Hydropower vs.
Salmon, supra note 52, at 245-46, 249-56.
75. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4344 (1982); see Hydropower vs. Salmon, supra note 52, at
262-68.
76. 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-666c (1982); see Hydropower vs. Salmon, supra note 52, at
268-76.
77. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313, 1323 (1982) (requiring states to set water quality standards
and federal agencies to meet them). The Ninth Circuit recently held that state water
quality standards could be invoked against federal timber operations. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n. v. Peterson, 764 F.2d 581, 588-89 (9th Cir. 1985). Perhaps
state water quality standards could have the same effect on dam operations, even though
dam operators are not required to obtain water pollutant discharge permits. National
Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
78. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982); see Bodi, Protecting Columbia River Salmon
Under the Endangered Species Act, 10 Envtl. L. 349 (1980).
79. Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967) (relying on § 10(a) of the Federal Power Act,
16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1982); the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-666c
(1982); and (astonishingly, since it is not applicable to the Columbia Basin) the Anadromous Fish Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 757a-757f (1982); see Hydropower vs. Salmon,
supra note 52, at 258-59.
80. An exception is the Ninth Circuit ruling that NEPA requires an Environmental
Impact Statement prior to relicensing the Rock Island Dam. Confederated Tribes and
Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. FERC, 746 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 2358 (1985); see Blumm, A Trilogy of Tribes v. FERC:Reforming the Federal
Role in Hydropower Licensing, 10 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 34-46 (1986). However, even
this decision had little effect on project operations, see id. at 46.
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(for example, listing endangered species or setting water quality standards), partly because some promise only procedural remedies (for example, NEPA and the Coordination Act), and partly due to a lack of
litigation on these issues in the Columbia Basin. Precedents from
outside the Basin are not particularly encouraging to those who would
challenge existing hydroelectric system operations on the basis of these
statutes."1 Ironically, the adjudicatory process governing nonfederal hydroelectric projects licensed under the Federal Power Act may offer
fishery advocates greater opportunities to influence project operations
than federal projects operated under multiple use directives from
Congress. "
III. The Northwest Power Act's Columbia Basin Fish and
Wildlife Program
One of the chief reasons for the lack of recent litigation to secure
fishery protection from hydroelectric projects under general environmental laws is the 1980 enactment of the Pacific Northwest Electric
Power Planning and Conservation Act (Northwest Power Act). 3 This
Act placed fishery protection and hydropower generation "on an equal
footing,"" authorized the creation of the Northwest Power Planning
Council, and directed the Council to develop a comprehensive program
designed to protect and restore Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife "to
the extent affected" by Columbia Basin hydroelectric development and
operations.8 " While the Act, the Council, and the program provide numerous topics for analysis,8 6 I prefer to focus class discussion on some
of the Act's innovations, the role of cost-benefit analysis in judging
program measures, and how program measures are enforced.

81. See County of Trinity v. Andrus, 438 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Cal. 1977); Missouri
v. Department of Army, 526 F. Supp. 660 (W.D. Mo. 1980), aff'd, 672 F.2d 1297 (8th Cir.
1982).
82. Compare Yakima Indian Nation, 746 F.2d 466, with Missouri v. Dept. of
Army, 536 F. Supp. 660. But see Bodi, FERC's Mid-Columbia Proceeding: Ten Years
and Still Counting, 16 Envtl. L. 555 (1986).
83. 16 U.S.C. § 839 (1982).
84. Yakima Indian Nation, 746 F.2d 466, 473 (9th Cir. 1984).
85. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(10)(A) (1982).
86. See Blumm & Johnson, Promising A Process For Parity: The Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act and Anadromous Fish Protection,
11 Envtl. L. 497 (1981) [Parity I]; Parity II, supra note 72; Blumm, Implementing the
Parity Promise: An Evaluation of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 14
Envtl. L. 277 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Parity III]; Blumm, Reexamining the Parity
Promise: More Challenges Than Successes To the Implementation of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 16 Envtl. L. 461 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Parity IV]].
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The Northwest Power Act provides for at least five innovations in
fish and wildlife law. First, its goals are fundamentally different than
those of statutes like the Coordination Act, which merely sought to
minimize fish and wildlife losses and which accepted hatchery production as compensation for losses of wild stocks."' The Northwest Power
Act is considerably more ambitious, calling for a systemwide remedial
program to restore fish runs by changing project operations to (1) supply increased flows for improved downstream migration of juvenile fish,
and (2) provide safer fish passage at individual projects. 8
Second, the Northwest Power Act establishes new procedures and
standards for formulating the contents of the Columbia Basin Fish and
Wildlife Program. Past efforts allowed agencies like the Corps of Engineers or the Bureau of Reclamation to develop mitigation measures in
consultation with fish and wildlife agencies; the Northwest Power Act
assigns this responsibility to the newly created Northwest Power Planning Council, an interstate agency without operational responsibilities
for particular projects.8 8 The Act requires extensive public participation before the Council approves program measures, including recommendations from fish and wildlife agencies and Indian tribes.90 This
"open process" approach is easily contrasted with the behind-closeddoors decision making that characterized the pre-Northwest Power Act
era.s ' The new process also effectively shifts the burden of proof to
entities opposed to the measures recommended by the fish and wildlife
agencies and tribes, by creating a presumption that their recommenda92
tions should be adopted.

87. See Parity II, supra note 72, at 108-12; Natural Resources Law Inst., The Fish
and Wildlife CoordinationAct and Columbia Basin Water Project Operations, 6 Anadromous Fish Law Memo (March 1980).
88. 16 U.S.C. §§ 839b(h)(1)(A) (1982) (systemwide program), (6)(E) (improved
flows and passage).
89. Id. §§ 839b(h)(5)-(7). I generally ask the class why the Council instead of the
project operators or the fishery agencies? Most students are quick to point out the
problems of entrusting this responsibility to the project operators (see sources cited
supra note 87), but many think Congress should have delegated to the fishery agencies
authority to develop and implement the program.
90. Id. §§ 839b(h)(2)-(7).
91. See Blumm, Risk Management and Northwest Electric Power Planning:Some
Lessons From the Rearview Mirror, 13 Envtl. L. 739, 756-60 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Risk Management Lessons].
92. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(7) (1982) (requiring the Council to explain in writing why
rejected recommendations fail to satisfy statutory standards, while giving "due weight"
the expertise of federal and state fishery agencies and Indian tribes).
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A third innovation is the concept of "offsite enhancement."9 3 Recognizing that some losses due to hydroelectric development and operations are irreversible (for example, the Middle Snake Basin anadromous fish runs extinguished by construction of Idaho Power
Company's damsS4), the Act calls for compensatory efforts for such
losses in areas where protection and restoration are still feasible (for
example, the Salmon and Clearwater Basins). Offsite enhancement
may be analogized to a checking account, where withdrawals represent
losses attributable to hydroelectric development and operations
throughout the Basin, and deposits represent past, present, and future
protection measures, including increased fish flows and passage improvements, and restoration efforts, such as habitat rehabilitation and
hatchery projects. Offsite enhancement justifies restoring the Salmon
and Clearwater runs beyond the extent damaged by hydroelectric
projects to compensate for the lost Middle Snake runs.
A fourth innovation concerns how the program's bills are paid.
While some projects will continue to be financed by federal tax dollars,9" the Act anticipates that most of the cost of restoring fish and
wildlife damaged by hydroelectric projects will be paid by the beneficiaries of those projects - electric ratepayers - through Bonneville
Power Administration (BPA) wholesale power rates." The class usually agrees that this is a fairer system than funding restoration through
federal tax dollars. It is also likely to provide funding more quickly
(important under a statute calling for expeditious action) and is clearly
subject to more regional control than the congressional appropriations
process.97 However, funding through BPA rates is an imperfect means
of achieving "enterprise liability," e since not all regional utilities
purchase equivalent amounts of BPA power. In fact, a utility like
Idaho Power Company, with its own hydroelectric projects, purchases
little BPA power, yet Idahoans will benefit considerably from the Columbia Basin Program's restoration measures.
The fifth innovation involves the establishment of new institutional arrangements created by the statute. The most prominent insti-

93. Id. §§ 839b(h)(5), (8)(A).
94. See Hydropower vs. Salmon, supra note 52, at 238-41.
95. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(10)(A) (1982) (requiring expenditures under the Act to be
"in addition to, not in lieu of, other expenditures authorized by law or required from
other entities under other agreements or provisions of law"). Thus, the Act expected
programs like the Corps of Engineers' Lower Snake Mitigation Plan and Mitchell Act
funding of hatcheries (supra note 71) to be funded separately.
96. Id.
97. See Parity III, supra note 86, at 348-51.
98. See Risk Management Lessons, supra note 91, at 760.
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tutional innovation is the Northwest Power Planning Council," a
nonfederal interstate agency given the duty to elevate fish and wildlife
to an "equal footing" with power production. 10 The Council promulgated (and subsequently amended) the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program and the Northwest Conservation and Electric Power
Plan, 10' stimulating and nurturing unprecedented public involvement.
Although the Council's authority over federal agencies is not entirely
settled,' 0 ' its creation revolutionized regional electric power and fish
and wildlife policies and may well prove to be a useful model for other
problems in other regions of the country.
Because the Council figures so prominently in any consideration of
the Northwest Power Act, two other, more easily overlooked institutional innovations deserve special emphasis: the evolution of an alliance between federal and state fish and wildlife agencies and the region's Indian tribes and the increased congressional role in formulating
the Columbia Basin Program. The former is familiar from the earlier
treaty rights discussion of internecine conflicts inhibiting effective remedial efforts. Unfortunately, conflicts between state fishery agencies
and the tribes are not all in the past, as the continuing conflict between the Idaho Department of Fish and Game and the tribes over
steelhead harvest on the Columbia River illustrates.' 3 The increased
congressional presence brought by the Northwest Power Act, however,
presents some new issues for discussion. The statute establishes a

99. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(a) (1982).
100. See Yakima Indian Nation, 746 F.2d at 473, supra note 84 and accompanying
text.
101. Northwest Power Planning Council, Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program (1984) [hereinafter cited as Columbia Basin Program]; discussed in Parity III,
supra note 86; Parity IV, supra note 86, Northwest Power Planning Council, Northwest
Conservation and Electric Power Plan (1986).
102. In Seattle Master Bldrs. Ass'n. v. Pacific Northwest Electric Power and Conservation Planning Council, 786 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1986), a divided panel of the Ninth
Circuit upheld the Council's constitutionality, but as of this writing, petitions for rehearing and certiorari seem likely. For analysis of this case, see Natural Resources Law Inst.,
Ninth Circuit Upholds Constitutionality of the Northwest Power Planning Council, 36
Anadromous Fish Law Memo (July 1986); Parity IV, supra note 86, at 486-90; Goble,
The Council and the Constitution: an Article on the Constitutionalityof the Northwest
Power Planning Council and the Property Clause, 1 J. of Envtl. L. & Litig. 10 (1986);
Blumm, The Appointments Clause,Innovative Federalism,and the Constitutionalityof
the Northwest Power PlanningCouncil, 8 J. Energy Law & Policy 1 (forthcoming, 1987).
See also Hemmingway, The Northwest Power Planning Council: Its Origins and Future
Role, 13 Envtl. L. 673 (1983).
103. See Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Comm'n., Steelhead - A Conflict of
Cultures, CRITFC News (Jan.-June 1985).
e

Electronic
copy available
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2986585
Electronic
copy available
at:at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=2986585

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

number of standards for program measures' 0 4 that narrow the Council's discretion in formulating the program and provide a basis for congressional oversight as well as judicial review. Thus, unlike the preNorthwest Power Act era, where fish and wildlife concerns rarely surfaced outside administrative agencies, the Act calls for widespread
public involvement, fosters new alliances, creates a new institutional
entity, and encourages debate on these issues to continue in Congress
and the courts.
At this point in the course, two classroom hypotheticals serve to
focus attention on issues continuing to generate controversy. The first
is a hypothetical amendment recommended by the fish and wildlife
agencies and tribes to increase interim spills (pending installation of
mechanical bypass systems) at particular mainstem dams to increase
juvenile fish survival. This amendment, similar to one proposed in
1986105 is opposed by power interests which allege that the recommendation's economic costs will be twice as great as its economic benefits.
My question to the class: can the Council reject the recommendation
on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis?'0 6
The hypothetical illustrates some of the shortcomings of cost-benefit analysis, especially the problems presented by balancing what appear to be "hard" economic costs (in reality, costs based on foregone
hydropower revenues depend upon numerous assumptions about water
conditions, project operations and available markets) against "soft"
fishery benefits (there is no data on what a particular spill level at a
given project will produce in terms of returning adult fish a generation
later, and probably never will be). We discuss the false sense of secur07
ity yielded by making decisions on the basis of cost-benefit analysis;1
how cost-benefit analysis might be a substitute for more reasoned decision making where pervasive uncertainties are disclosed at the outset;
and whether cost-benefit decision making would violate Northwest
Power Act standards favoring biological outcomes over economic
ones, 10 8 providing improved fish survival, 09 requiring action on the ba-

104. See Parity II, supra note 72, at 115-16 (listing 10 standards).
105. See Parity IV, supra note 86, at 483-85.
106. See Parity II, supra note 72, at 147-52.
107. See generally Conservation Foundation, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Environmental Regulations: Politics,Ethics, and Methods (D. Swartzman, R. Liroff & K. Croke
eds. 1982); Rogers, Benefits, Costs and Risks: Oversight of Health and Environmental
Decisionmaking, 4 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 191 (1980); Baram, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An
Inadequate Basis For Health, Safety and Environmental Regulatory Decisionmaking,8
Ecology L.Q. 473 (1980).
108. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(C) (1982); see Parity II, supra note 72, at 131-37.
109. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(E)(i) (1982).
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sis of "best available scientific evidence,"" and protecting Indian
treaty rights."'
My students are usually less interested in theory than results: they
want to know whether the recommendation can be denied on cost-benefit grounds. I can now report, "not according to the Council"' and,
surprisingly, not according to an administrative law judge of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)."" 3 This recognition,
however, did not prevent the Council from largely rejecting the pro4
posed 1986 amendment on other grounds."
The second hypothetical focuses on the enforceability of program
measures. Even if the Council approves fish survival measures for a
Corps of Engineers' or FERC-licensed dam, the Corps and FERC are
only obligated to take the Council's directive "into account ... to the
fullest extent practicable."" 5 Although the Council interprets that directive to require implementation of the measures or written explanations of why a measure is not "physically, legally, or otherwise practicable ... including a description of all possible allowances available to
permit implementation,""' ' no court has approved this interpretation,
and no federal agency has expressly employed it."' Whether a court
would find a failure to implement the program's spill provisions to be a
violation of the Act is a thought-provoking question,"' usually evoking
a response that the statutory provision should be rewritten."'

110. Id. § 839b(h)(6)(B); see Parity II, supra note 72, at 124-31.
111. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(D) (1982); see Parity II, supra note 72, at 139-46.
112. Northwest Power Planning Council, Notice of Final Amendments (Feb. 13,
1986), discussed in Parity IV, supra note 86, at 484 n. 128.
113. Public Utility Dist. No. 1 of Chelan County, Washington, 34 F.E.R.C. 1 63,044
(1986), discussed in Parity IV, supra note 86, at 508-09.
114. See supra note 112 (Council's conclusion that the proposal would not produce
"significant biological benefits"); Parity IV, supra note 86, at 483-84.
115. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(11)(A)(ii).
116. Columbia Basin Program, supra note 101, § 1304(a)(4)(B).
117. However, the FERC administrative law judge in the Rock Island Dam proceeding interpreted the program to require FERC to search for and order installation of
"best available" fish collection and bypass systems. 34 F.E.R.C. $ 63,044, at 65,171; See
Purity IV, supra note 86, at 509.
118. When presented with this question, my students generally conclude that the
variables include whether (1) the Council brought the suit (or joined in it), (2) the fishery
agencies and/or Indian tribes brought the suit (or joined in it), (3) a written record accompanied the decision not to spill, and (4) the written record relied on a statutory
conflict or a physical impracticability.
119. Many students want to amend the statute to read "consistent with the program," or at least "consistent to the fullest extent possible."
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Regulating The Ocean Harvest

The ocean, a classic commons, supplies an ideal opportunity to review the lessons of Garrett Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons. 20 And
the ocean salmon fishery exhibits all the consequences of the tragedy:
overharvesting, premature harvesting, a lack of enhancement incentives, and overinvestment in harvesting technology. While the need to
regulate harvest effort now seems self-evident, in fact the ocean fishery
was the last salmon fishery to be subjected to comprehensive regulation. Students are always surprised to learn that the salmon troll fishery was not subjected to federal regulation until the Pacific Fishery
Management Council promulgated its 1978 Salmon Fishery Management Plan (FMP) 2 under the Fishery Conservation and Management
1 22
Act.
Class time is well spent tracing the evolution of jurisdictional
claims to ocean resources, in terms of both national claims and federalstate relations. This backdrop begins with the Jeffersonian three-mile
limit - the range of a cannon shot - as the original extent of national
claims of sovereignty. 2 8 Offshore oil development in southern California - which began in the 1890s and which, by the late 1930s, was regulated by to a state leasing program - produced pressure to extend
federal control. 124 Because the state's program produced substantial
revenues, federal officials challenged the state's jurisdiction over off2 5
shore mineral resources.1
At the same time, Alaskan fishers became
concerned about foreign salmon harvests, prompting Congress to consider bills that would exclude foreign fishers from the Alaskan continental shelf, effectively claiming ownership of anadromous fish some
2 6
400 miles offshore.
World War II delayed resolution of these issues. In 1945, the Truman Proclamations claimed United States' control over continental

120. 162 Science 1243 (1968); see also J. Crutchfield & G. Pontecorvo, The Pacific
Salmon Fisheries:A Study of Irrational Conservation (1969).
121. Pacific Fishery Management Council, Final Environmental Impact Statement and Fishery Management Plan for Commercial and Recreational Salmon Fisheries off the Coasts of Washington, Oregon, and California Commencing in 1978 (1978).
122. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1982 & Supp. II 1984); see Wilkinson & Conner,
supra note 2, at 48-53, 94-96.
123. See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 33 n.16 (1947).
124. See generally E. Bartley, The Tidelands Oil Controversy (1953).
125. See Breeden, Federalism and the Development of Outer Continental Shelf
Resources, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 1107, 1111 (1976).
126. See Magnuson, The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976:
First Step Toward Improved Management of Marine Fisheries, 52 Wash. L. Rev. 427,
428-29 (1977).
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shelf resources and also claimed the right to establish fishery conservation zones."2 7 Two years later, the Supreme Court agreed with the Truman Administration that the federal government, not the states, had
jurisdiction over offshore oil and gas development.12 8 However, in 1953
the Eisenhower Administration convinced Congress to pass the Submerged Lands Act, giving the states ownership of the seabed out to
three miles.' 2 9 Later that year, Congress enacted the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act, establishing a federal oil and gas leasing system on
the continental shelf beyond three miles.' In 1958, the Law of the Sea
Conference ratified United States' claims to the continental shelf in
the Convention on the Continental Shelf.' 3' However, the 1958 Conference sanctioned fishery conservation zones of only twelve miles,' 3 and
the United States failed to establish such a contiguous zone until
1966.'3
By the middle 1970s, an increasingly sophisticated and mobile foreign fishing fleet harvested around seventy percent of the commercial
catch in United States offshore waters. 34 Congress reacted by passing
the 1976 Fishery Conservation and Management Act, later named the
Magnuson Act,13 5 largely as a protectionist measure to limit foreign
harvests in fertile fisheries like Georges Bank. The Act established a
200-mile federal fishery zone, authorized eight Regional Fishery Management Councils to allocate harvests, 3 and set criteria to guide Re-

127. See id. at 429-30.
128. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947); see R. Hildreth & R. Johnson,
Ocean and Coastal Law 168-69 (1983) and sources cited therein.
129. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1982); see R. Hildreth, supra note 128, at 171-76.
130. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1982); see Breeden, supra note 125, at 1112-15.
131. Convention on the Continental Shelf, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 471 (pt. 1), T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, entered into force by the United
States June 10, 1964.
132. See Magnuson, supra note 126, at 430.
133. Bartlett Act, Pub. L. No. 89-658, 80 Stat. 908 (1966); see Fidell, Ten Years
Under the Bartlett Act: A Status Report on the Prohibition of Foreign Fishing, 54
B.U.L. Rev. 703 (1974).
134. Magnuson, supra note 126, at 431.
135. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-82 (1982).
136. All fishery management plans must conform to seven national standards: (1)
prevent overfishing, while assuring optimum yield harvests; (2) make decisions on the
basis of "best scientific information available"; (3) manage stocks and interrelated stocks
as units, to the extent practicable; (4) not discriminate on the basis of state residency
and make allocation decisions that are "fair and equitable," promote conservation, and
do not give particular entities excessive privileges; (5) make decisions that promote efficiency, where practicable, but economic allocation cannot be the sole purpose of conservation and management measures; (6) take into account variations and contingencies;
and (7) minimize costs and avoid unnecessary duplication. Id. § 1851.
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gional Council decision making.13 7 The federally appointed fishery
councils, in contrast to the nonfederal Northwest Power Planning
Council, are subject to additional procedural requirements, including
NEPA requirements, while avoiding potential appointments clause
challenges. '3 8 Ironically, a statute originally conceived as a protectionist measure finally brought federal conservation regulation to the Pacific salmon fishery.
Focusing specifically on the development of the Pacific Fishery
Management Council's (PFMC) Salmon Fishery Management Plan,
class attention turns to the organization of the PFMC, the process of
approving a fishery management plan, the relationship between the
PFMC and the Secretary of Commerce, and the authority of the
PFMC and the Secretary to preempt state regulation in state waters
within the three mile limit.1 3 9 Class discussion contrasts the key management concept of "optimum yield" with the more familiar "maximum sustained yield. ' "4 0 If maximum sustained yield, measured in
pounds of fish, were the litmus for salmon harvests, there would be no
ocean harvest at all."" On the one hand, the PFMC sets "optimum
yield" harvests twelve to eighteen percent greater than "maximum sustained yield" would warrant. The PFMC's reasons for the higher optimum yield are the recreation value of the ocean fishery and the greater
market-value of ocean-caught Columbia River fall chinook, due both to
perceived quality difference and different marketing channels." 2 On
the other hand, it is unlikely that a group of ocean trollers could successfully challenge the PFMC's "optimum yield" as being too low to
protect historic fishing practices. Even if there is "law to apply" in the
definition of optimum yield, a court would be reluctant to reverse the

137. Id. §§ 1811, 1852, 1851; see generally J. Jacobson, D. Conner & R. Tozer,
Federal Fisheries Management (1985 ed.).
138. On the appointments clause issue, see sources cited supra note 102.
139. See generally J. Jacobson, supra note 137, at 43-99. On the state role, see
Greenberg & Shapiro, Federalismin the Fishery ConservationZone: A New Role for the
States in an Era of Federal Regulatory Reform, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 641 (1982).
140. Congress felt that maximum sustained yield, the largest annual yield (in terms
of pounds of fish) that can be harvested continuously under existing environmental conditions, was too narrowly focused, ignoring ecological relationships and social and economic interests. See J. Jacobson, supra note 136, at 17-18. Thus, the Act defined optimum yield, as the amount of fish "prescribed as such on the basis of maximum
sustainable yield ... as modified by any relevant economic, social or ecological factor" to
provide the greatest overall national benefits, especially food production and recreational
opportunities. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(18) (1982).
141. See J. Jacobson, supra note 137, at 20 (noting that only in-river fishing would
be allowed).
142. Id.
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PFMC or the Secretary of Commerce, especially since maintenance of
historic fishing practices is not an express concern of the Magnuson
3
Act."
Our survey of ocean harvest regulation then turns to the problems
that a "mixed stock" ocean fishery poses for restoration of particular
fish runs, especially wild stocks. The mixed stock fishery presents a
dilemma to the PFMC: either overharvest wild stocks to adequately
harvest the more abundant hatchery stocks, or protect wild stocks
44
while producing an excess of hatchery stocks back at the hatchery.1
By harvesting only in-river, the Indians may have had the right idea all
along; the benefits of distant, intercepting ocean fisheries do not seem
to be worth their costs, at least in the case of anadromous species.
Of course, Indian treaty rights are affecting ocean harvest decisions. For example, a recent decision by Judge Walter Craig ordered
the PFMC to protect treaty fishing rights by managing the ocean harvest on a run-by-run, river-by-river basis. 4 5 Whether such management is technically possible is not entirely clear, but Judge Craig's decision should spur research and perhaps new technologies aimed at
closely tracking the ocean migrations of particular runs. Just as technological developments like the tin can, the refrigerated railroad car,
and gasoline-powered engines created the demand for and means to
obtain an ocean harvest, perhaps technological developments enabling
managers to identify run migrations will allow the ocean fishery to continue in an era committed to rebuilding depleted upriver wild stocks. 4'
V. International Cooperation and Interstate Allocation
Until the ratification of the 1985 Salmon Interception Treaty between Canada and the United States, " 7 the largest regulatory loophole

143. Historic fishing practices might be a "relevant economic or social factor"
under the statute's definition of "optimum yield," supra note 140. However, this is probably a matter committed to administrative discretion, unless administrative concern over
protecting historic fishing practices conflicted with the Act's goal of preventing overfishing, supra note 136. Cf. Maine v. Kreps, 563 F.2d 1043 (1st Cir. 1977), discussed in J.
Jacobson, supra note 137, at 23-24.
144. See Columbia Basin Program, supra note 101, § 501. On the importance of
wild fish, see infra text accompanying notes 174-75.
145. Hoh Indian Tribe v. Baldrige, 522 F. Supp. 683, 689 (W.D. Wash. 1981) aff'd
702 F.2d 820, 822-23 (9th Cir. 1983) (rejecting the Washington State Charterboat Association's "aggregate approach" which would have allowed ocean fishers to take more than
half of the chinook and coho stocks in return for allowing the tribes to harvest more than
half of the chum and sockeye stocks).
146. See Wilkinson & Conner, supra note 2, at 85-92; infra text accompanying
notes 172-75.
147. U.S.T. -,
T.I.A.S. -.
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in the salmon life cycle occurred when the fish runs migrated north
into Canadian and Alaskan waters. For example, in 1981 about sixtyfive percent of the upper Columbia River wild chinook stocks were harvested offshore of British Columbia and Alaska.14 Because Canada
long felt that the United States share of Fraser River sockeye and pink
runs under the 1937 Fraser River Treaty was too high, " " the Canadians proved willing to reduce their interceptions of Columbia River chinook in return for reduced United States harvests of the Fraser River
runs. Thus, in late 1982, negotiators reached agreement on a draft
Treaty. ' "° However, Alaskan interests, aware of the fact that over
eighty percent of the chinook harvested in Alaskan waters originated in
Canadian, Washington, Oregon, and Idaho rivers, 151152succeeded in delaying ratification of the Treaty for over two years.
Nevertheless, the Salmon Intercept Treaty was finally ratified in
1985 "', and it promises to alter significantly the ocean harvest effort.
Not only does the Treaty require reduced transboundary interceptions,
it also establishes a coastwide stock rebuilding program, focusing especially on wild chinook stocks.15 4 The principal beneficiaries of this rebuilding effort will be upriver interests, especially treaty Indians and
Idahoans.
After spending a number of years explaining to students why an
interception treaty was a prerequisite to successful restoration efforts
such as those under way pursuant to the Northwest Power Act, I have
not decided how to present the ratified treaty. While its substantive
provisions will interest students, the process of negotiating and implementing the Treaty warrants some comment.155 Also of interest will be

148. See Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Comm'n., Briefing Booklet: United
States v. Washington, Non-Treaty Catch Accounting Proceeding, Table 1 (1984) (23.6%
of the 1981 upper Columbia River bright fall chinook run harvested by Alaska, 40.6%
harvested by Canada).
149. 8 U.S.T. 1057, T.I.A.S. No. 3857; see Wilkinson & Conner, supra note 2, at 58
n.224.
150. For a comprehensive overview of the events leading up to the 1985 ratification
of the Salmon Interception Treaty, as well as an overview of the Treaty itself, see Jensen, The United States/CanadaPacific Salmon Interception Treaty: An Historicaland
Legal Overview, 16 Envtl.L. 363 (1986).
151. See Conner, The Troubled Pacific Salmon Treaty: Why It Must Be Ratified,
24 Ocean Law Memo 8 (Sept. 1983).
152. For an Alaskan perspective on the Treaty, see Senator Stevens' account,
United States-CanadaTreaty Negotiations: The Alaskan Experience, 16 Envtl.L. 423
(1986).
153.

-

U.S.T.

-,

T.I.A.S.

-.

154. See Jensen, supra note 150, at 405.
155. Fortunately, these events are recounted in exhaustive detail in id.
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a comparison to other international agreements such as the treaty between the United States, Canada, and Japan, " 6 which has enabled the
nations to overharvest Yukon River
Japanese and other Far Eastern
8 7
chinook in the Bering Sea.1
Somewhat analogous to international treaties are interstate compacts. The most prominent interstate compact allocating salmon harvest is the 1918 Columbia River Compact, 88 under which Oregon and
Washington jointly regulate in-river harvests. Compact regulation has
been materially affected by both Indian treaty rights litigation and a
negotiated five-year settlement plan that allocated harvests while safeguarding treaty rights. 5 9 Currently, the states and the tribes are close
to a new agreement that would establish a new plan under the continuing jurisdiction of the United States v. Oregon court. Ironically, Idaho
long denied admission to the Columbia River Compact but recently
allowed to intervene in the litigation - has proved to be the chief
stumbling block to a new plan. s0
The Idaho role in Columbia River harvest allocation is a curious
one. Clearly the "odd man out," the state has been unable to gain the
consent of its sister states to be admitted to the Compact and unable
to obtain an equitable apportionment decree from the Supreme
Court.' 6 ' However, its trips to the Supreme Court have established the
proposition that natural resources other than water, specifically anadromous fish, can be equitably apportioned by the Court, although the
burden on the state is a heavy one. 6 ' Idaho's admission to the United
States v. Oregon litigation should add a strong voice for upriver restoration, but so far the state's principal contribution has been to deadlock negotiations over tribal steelhead harvests.' " Unless the state

156. International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific
Ocean May 9, 1952, United States-Canada-Japan, 4 U.S.T. 380, T.I.A.S. No. 2786.
157. See Sathre, Salmon Interception on the High Seas: A Continuing Controversy Between the United States and Japan, 16 Envtl. L. 731 (1986).
158. 40 Stat. 515; see Wilkinson & Conner, supra note 2, at 73-74. In the Seattle
Master Builders case, supra note 102, the court concluded that the Northwest Power
Planning Council is an interstate compact organization, 786 F.2d at 1363-64.
159. See Heinemann & Rosenbaum, Securing A Fair Share: Indian Treaty Rights
and the "Comprehensive" Plan For the Columbia River, 21 Anadromous Fish Law
Memo (Mar. 1983).
160. See Harrison, The Evolution of A New Comprehensive Plan For Managing
Columbia River Anadromous Fish, 16 Envtl.L. 705, 725-28 (1986).
161. See McArthur-Phillips, Odd Man Out: Idaho's Bid For a Fair Share of Columbia River Upriver Anadromous Fish Stocks, 10 Envtl. L. 389 (1980) (discussing
Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 444 U.S. 380 (1980)).
162. Idaho v. Oregon and Washington, 462 U.S. 1017 (1983).
163. See Harrison, supra note 160, at 725-28; CRITFC News, supra note 103.
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comes to view the treaty tribes as upriver allies, Idahoans are unlikely
to reap the full benefits that cooperative restoration efforts under the
Northwest Power Act and the Pacific Salmon Interception Treaty
could produce."'
VI.

Wild, Hatchery, and Mixed Stocks: The Challenge of
Restoration

The Pacific Salmon Law course concludes with a review of the
conflicts posed by managing a mixed stock fishery composed of both
wild and hatchery stocks. 6 5 The class briefly considers the history of
hatchery production, a technology over two hundred years old." Although large-scale artificial propagation was underway by the turn of
the century, problems with nutrition and disease hampered hatcheries,
and Columbia Basin production declined in the years following World
War II.' However, improvements in disease control, diet, and rearing
techniques encouraged the federal government 6 " and the states to undertake a five-fold increase in Columbia Basin hatchery production between 1960 and 1974.169 Oregon even initiated the nation's first private
salmon ranching program' 7 0 a program whose expansion was stymied
by an Oregon Supreme Court decision in 1981.111
Despite this massive commitment, hatcheries have failed to prevent run-size declines. Moreover, the 1980s have witnessed rising concern with the effects of hatchery production on wild stock preservation
including apprehension over the incentive hatcheries provide to
overharvest mixed stocks, questions about whether hatchery fish overtax carrying capacities of estuaries or the ocean, and anxiety over dilution of genetic diversity.17 As a result, the policy of both the Northwest Power Planning Council's Columbia Basin Program and the

164. Senator McClure recently denied funding to the tribes to carry out their responsibilities for implementing the Salmon Interception Treaty, an action that could do
nothing but harm Idaho's interests. See Jensen, supra note 150, at 419-20 n.206.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 144-45.
166. See Donaldson & Joyner, The Salmoid Fishes As Natural Livestock, 249 Scientific American 50 (July 1983).
167. See Wilkinson & Conner, supra note 2, at 82.
168. Largely through the Mitchell Act, see supra 71.
169. See Wilkinson & Conner, supra note 2, at 82.
170. See Berg, Private Salmon Ranching of Pacific Salmon and Fishery Management: A Problem of Federalism, 12 Envtl. L. 81 (1981).
171. Federation of Independent Seafood Harvesters v. Oregon Fish and Wildlife
Comm'n., 291 Or. 452, 632 P.2d 777 (1981) (enjoining issuance of a hatchery permit for
failure to find no detrimental effect on wild stocks).
172. See, e.g., Oregon Trout's Scientific Advisory Committee, The Value of Wild
Fish, 30 Anadromous Fish Law Memo 14 (June 1985); Natural Resources Law Inst.,
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Salmon Interception Treaty is to preserve wild stocks to the maximum
extent feasible.1 7 3 As the Council's Program observes:
"Maintenance of genetic diversity of stocks is essential to the
vigor and survival of a species . . ." A primary goal of the
Council's program is to restore wild and natural propagation of
salmon and steelhead in the Columbia River system. Fish that
spawn naturally are subjected to constant selective pressures,
resulting in an evolution toward strong, resilient, and diverse
stocks. Since each stream or drainage offers a different environment which influences the natural selection process, the fish
stocks originating there will be genetically unique to that
7 4
drainage.
Wild stocks are also immune from another shortcoming of hatchery
stocks: dependence on continued federal and state funding, which is
hardly assured, especially given the Reagan Administration's consistent efforts to cut federal funding under the Mitchell Act. 75
While wild stock restoration is highly desirable, hatchery production must continue for the foreseeable future if harvest levels are to be
maintained. Note also that wild stock propagation requires (1) widespread coordination among many different water management agencies
with conflicting missions, (2) willingness of harvest managers to limit
harvest effort in mixed stock fisheries, and (3) patience, since the rewards for some wild stock investments are sometimes two or three life
cycles removed.
VII.

Conclusion

The Pacific Salmon Law course is not a specialized one; on the
contrary, it is an eclectic combination of Indian law, water law, ocean
law, Northwest power law, administrative law, and international law. It

Workshop on the Late, Great Columbia River Fishery (PartI), 32 Anadromous Fish
Law Memo 6-7 (Aug. 1985) (Bill Bakke explaining the importance of wild fish).
173. See supra note 154 and accompanying text and infra note 174 and accompanying text. A similar conclusion was reached by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's administrative law judge in the Rock Island Dam proceeding. See Public Utility
Dist. No. 1 of Chelan County, Washington, 34 F.E.R.C. 63,044, at 65,172-73 (1986) (ordering the utility to protect wild stocks "to the maximum extent possible"); discussed in
Parity IV, supra note 86, at 508 n.234.
174. Columbia Basin Program, supra note 101, J] 701; see generally B. Brown,
Mountain In the Clouds: A Search For the Wild Salmon (1982).
175. See supra note 71; Natural Resources Law Inst., Funding and Other Implementation Challenges to the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 24 Anadromous Fish Law Memo 5-6 (Mar. 1984).
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is also a subject that is evolving rapidly - a course taught only seven
years ago would not include the Northwest Power Act, The Salmon
Steelhead Enhancement Act, 7 1 the Salmon Interception Treaty, the
Supreme Court's affirmance of the Boldt decision, and numerous other
recent developments. Nor is the outline sketched here the only way to
structure a Pacific Salmon Law course. For example, the emphasis on
hydropower generation could easily be replaced by an emphasis on
timber harvesting. There are a number of recent cases in which litigants concerned about anadromous fish runs have invoked diverse provisions of federal laws to enjoin road building and timber harvests on
national forest lands."' Growing concern over the effects of public land
management on fish habitat likely will produce a new chapter of Pa78
cific Salmon Law in the years ahead.1
Historically, the role of the law in the management of Pacific
salmon has been largely deleterious, ratifying jurisdictional boundaries
that had no relationship to anadromous fish migrations. Recent years
have witnessed the law in a more therapeutic role, not only expanding
jurisdictional limits but also supplying new remedies against activities
damaging the fish runs. While an optimum jurisdictional unit for managing Pacific salmon probably will remain an elusive goal, 9 the law
now seems more prepared to respond to the resource's biology. My
hope is that this course will prepare lawyers capable of influencing that
response, and that this Article will spawn other courses in Pacific
Salmon Law. It is a fertile and rewarding area of legal study.

176. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3301-45 (1982). I deal only briefly with this statute in class
because, while its comprehensive fishery planning goal is laudable, the Act seems to have
produced few results. See Elicker, The Salmon and Steelhead Enhancement Act: Laudable Objectives, Little Funding, 15 Anadromous Fish Law Memo (Aug. 1981); Wilkinson
& Conner, supra note 2, at 106.
177. For three recent cases enjoining timber harvesting and/or road building on
national forest lands in California, Idaho, and Oregon, in large measure due to concerns
about potential effects on anadromous fish runs, see Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n. v. Peterson, 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985); Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754
(9th Cir. 1985); and National Wildlife Federation v. United States Forest Service, 592 F.
Supp. 931 (D. Or. 1984), appeal pending.
178. See Braun, Livestock Grazing In Riparian Zones: Ensuring Fishery Protection In Federal Rangeland Management, 37 ANADROMAOUS FISH LAW MEMO (Oct. 1986).
179. Cf. Zerbe, Optimum Environmental Jurisdictions,4 Ecology L.Q. 193 (1974);
Coggins, Grizzly Bears Don't Stop At Customs: A Preface To TransboundaryProblems
in Natural Resources Law, 32 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1 (1983).
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